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RECENT CASES
Civil Procedure-Class Actions-Order Dismissing
Class Action that Leaves Plaintiff To Litigate a Small
Monetary Claim Is Not a Final Appealable Order Under
28 U.S.C. § 1291
Plaintiff consumer, claiming to represent one and one-half million
purchasers of defendants" products, filed a class action 2 under section
4 of the Clayton Act,3 seeking treble damages, costs, and attorney's
fees from defendants for alleged antitrust violations.4 Defendants suc-
cessfully moved for a stay of proceedings pending the district court's
determination of whether the case could be maintained as a class action.
The court found the class unmanageable 5 and, in accordance with Rule
23(c)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,6 issued an order deny-
ing confirmation of the class action. Plaintiff, left with a valid individual
1. Defendants were .7 baking firms that sold bread within the Philadelphia market area.
2. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3) provides for the maintenance of a class action when the court
finds that the issues of law or fact common to the class members predominate over individual
issues, and that a class action is the superior method for a fair and efficient adjudication. The
federal class action serves a dual purpose both by providing for efficient adjudication of multiple
claims, and, perhaps more importantly, by creating an opportunity for plaintiffs with small claims
to obtain judicial relief despite the prohibitive costs of individual litigation. Although this latter
purpose has been somewhat circumscribed by the recent Supreme Court ruling in Snyder v. Harris,
394 U.S. 332 (1969), which precludes the aggregation of separate claims to obtain the required
$10,000 jurisdictional amount, it does have continued vitality under several statutory causes of
action that obviate the requirement of a minimum amount in controversy. See, e.g., 15
U.S.C. § 15 (1970) (eliminating the $10,000 requirement in any suit brought under federal antitrust
laws). Within the context of these statutes- the class action serves not only as a source of individual
relief, but also as a supplement to public regulatory enforcement. For a general discussion of the
federal class action see 3B J. MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 23.01-.97 (2d ed. 1969) [hereinafter
cited as MOORE].
3. 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1970).
4. Defendants were accused of conspiring to fix the prices and terms for sales of bread in
the Philadelphia area, in violation of the Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-2 (1970). A
criminal indictment, under which the district court had accepted defendants' plea of nolo contend-
ere, had already been filed. United States v. General Host Corp., Crim. No. 23,200 (E.D. Pa.
1968).
5. Among the matters pertinent to the court's determination under rule 23(c)(1) are "the
difficulties likely to be encountered in the management of a class action." FED. R. Civ. P.
23(b)(3)(D).
6. Rule 23(c)(1) provides that the district court shall, as soon as practical after the class
action has been brought, determine by order whether the action may be maintained. The order
may be conditional, and may be altered or amended at any time before decision on the merits.
FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(1).
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action for only nine dollars, 7 requested that the district court amend its
order to certify immediate interlocutory appeal of the class action issue
under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b).' When certification was refused, plaintiff
filed notice of appeal, contending that the order denying confirmation
of her class action was a final appealable order within the scope of 28
U.S.C. § 1291.1 Plaintiff based her contention on the "death knell"
rule,10 which treats an order dismissing a class action as final under
section 1291 when that order for all practical purposes terminates the
litigation by leaving plaintiff with an individual monetary claim too
small to justify the costs of continued adjudication on the merits. On
petition to the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit,
held, dismissed. An order denying confirmation of a class action that
leaves a plaintiff to litigate a small claim for monetary damages is not
a final appealable order within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1291. Hack-
ett v. General Host Corp., 455 F.2d 618 (3d Cir. 1971).
The "final judgment rule," as set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 1291,11
grants federal appellate courts jurisdiction over all final district court
decisions.' 2 This prerequisite of a final decision, traditionally interpreted
as one that "leaves nothing for the court to do but execute the judg-
ment," 13 implements a strong policy against the costs, delays, and
docket-crowding of piecemeal litigation, which might result from allow-
ing separate interlocutory appeals for various intermediate rulings
within cases. 4 Since denying confirmation of a class action does not
dismiss the individual actions of would-be class representatives, under
the traditional finality doctrine such denials never would be immediately
7. The $10,000 jurisdictional requirement does not apply to suits brought under the Clayton
Act. 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1970).
8. Upon certification by a district court that an interlocutory order involves a "controlling
question of law as to which there is substantial ground for difference of opinion and that an
immediate appeal from the order may materially advance the ultimate termination of the litigation
..... "the court of appeals may, in its discretion, permit immediate appeal of the order. 28
U.S.C. § 1292(b) (1970).
9. Section 1291 grants to the courts of appeal appellate jurisdiction over all final decisions
of the district courts. 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1970).
10. The "death knell" rule was first promulgated in Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 370 F.2d
119 (2d Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 1035 (1967). See notes 32-33 infra and accompanying
text.
II. See note 9 supra.
12. For a summary of development of the final judgment rule see generally 9 MOORE, supra
note 2 1 110.06-.0811].
13. Catlin v. United States, 324 U.S. 229, 233 (1945); see also Exparte Norton, 108 U.S.
237 (1883).
14. See Catlin v. United States, 324 U.S. 229, 233-34 (1945); Cobbledick v. United States,
309 U.S. 323, 324-25 (1940).
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appealable. The need for judicial flexibility in the pursuit of both justice
and efficiency,"5 however, has subjected the final judgment rule to sev-
eral statutory and judicial qualifications. The oldest of these exceptions
are the extraordinary writs' 6-particularly prohibition and manda-
mus-which enable an appellate court to confine or compel an inferior
court to actions within the lower court's lawful jurisdiction.17 These
writs cannot be used, however, to limit or compel actions within the
scope of the inferior court's discretion, 8 and therefore have severely
limited application to orders dismissing class actions, since such orders
seem well within the discretion of the district courts." Instead, the prin-
cipal statutory authority for interlocutory appeal is the Interlocutory
Decisions Appeals Act of 1958,0 which in section 1292(b) grants the
courts of appeal discretion to review orders that, as certified by the
district court, deal with a controlling question of law, the disposition of
which by an appellate court might materially advance the termination
of the litigation."' This section supplemented the pre-existing section
1292(a)(1)," which grants a mandatory right to interlocutory appeal
from an order denying injunctive relief, but while section 1292(a)(1) has
been applied to orders dismissing class actions when the order narrows
or eliminates the injunctive relief sought,2l only the Fifth Circuit has,
to date, allowed section 1292(b) appeal of an interlocutory class action
dismissal.24 Rule 54(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, however,
provides a third exception to the finality of judgments doctrine. That
rule vests in the district courts discretion to allow immediate appeal
from an order that finally determines one or more claims in a multiple-
15. 9 MOORE, supra note 2 1 110.08[1].
16. All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1651 (1970) (first enacted in 1789).
17. Id. See Note, Mandamus Proceedings in the Federal Courts ofAppeals: A Compromise
with Finality, 52 CALIF. L. REV. 1036 (1964). See generally 9 MOORE, supra note 2 1 110.26.
18. In re Rice, 155 U.S. 396 (1894).
19. FED. R. Civ. P. 23 is easily read as contemplating a broad exercise of the district court's
discretion in determining whether to permit maintenance of a class action. Cf. Interpace Corp. v.
City of Philadelphia, 438 F.2d 401 (3d Cir. 1971) (denying petition by defendants in a class action
suit for writ of mandamus to vacate order certifying the class action).
20. 28 U.S.C. 1292(b) (1970); see note 8 supra.
21. 28 U.S.C. 1292(b) (1970).
22. 28 U.S.C. 1292(a)(1) (1970).
23. Oatis v. Crown Zellerbach Corp., 398 F.2d 496 (5th Cir. 1968); Brunson v. Board of
Trustees, 311 F.2d 107 (4th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 373 U.S. 933 (1963).
24. Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc., 417 F.2d 1122 (5th Cir. 1969) (order substan-
tially diminishing the class plaintiff could represent). See Kaplan, Continuing Work of the Civil




claim litigation,25 and at least one court has allowed Rule 54(b) appeal
of an order dismissing a class action." A more flexible method of avoid-
ing the final judgment does not derive from statutory exception, but
from liberal judicial interpretation of the rule itself. In Cohen v. Benefi-
cial Industrial Loan Corp.,27 for example, plaintiff in a shareholders'
derivative action sought immediate appeal of an order that required the
posting of a bond to cover the expenses of litigation. In a landmark
decision, the Supreme Court held that the order was appealable under
section 1291 because the bond requirement was important to the litiga-
tion and was separable from and collateral to the merits of the action,
and because deferral of appeal might result in the irreparable loss of
plaintiff's rights with respect to the issue upon which interlocutory ap-
peal was sought.28 The Court, in formulating this "collateral order"
doctrine, emphasized that section 1291 must be given a practical rather
than a technical interpretation .2  This construction has been reaffirmed
in Gillespie v. United States Steel Corp.,3 in which the Supreme Court
expanded the Cohen doctrine to allow the courts of appeal discretion
to review questions "fundamental to the further conduct of the case"
even when previously required indicia of finality were not present.3'
Only the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit has
applied the Cohen and Gillespie rationale to the appealability under
section 1291 of orders dismissing class actions. In a series of decisions,
the Second Circuit has undertaken to deliniate a doctrine on a case-by-
25. FED. R. Civ. P. 54(b). See 9 MOORE, supra note 2 110.09.
26. Haynes v. Sealtest Food Div. of the Nat'l Dairy Prods. Corp., 396 F.2d 448 (3d Cir.
•1968). The court apparently treated the class action dismissal as a final determination of the claims
presented for the nonparty class members; the holding does raise questions of plaintiff's standing
to appeal for the nonparty members who were denied relief. 9 MOORE, supra note 2 110.13[9].
27.. 337 U.S. 541 (1949).
28. Id. at 546. The Cohen rule requires 3 elements for qualification: (1) the order must be a
final determination of rights separable from and collateral to the merits; (2) the order must present
a serious and unsettled question too important to be denied review; and (3) review of the order
cannot await ultimate judgment because appellant's rights may be irreparably lost through the
delay. 9 MOORE, supra note 2 110.10. For other orders held appealable under the Cohen
rationale see Stock v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1 (1951) (order denying motion to reduce bail); Swift &
Compania Colombiana Del Caribe, 339 U.S. 684 (1950) (order vacating attachment); Collins v.
Miller, 198 F.2d 948 (D.C. Cir. 1952) (order dismissing a petition for removal of an administra-
tor). See generally 9 MOORE, supra note 2 110.10.
29. 337 U.S. at 546.
30. 379 U.S. 148 (1964).
31. Id. at 153. In Gillespie, the district court had struck down 2 of plaintiff's 3 claims for
wrongful death, eliminating the relief sought for nonparty dependents of the deceased. In allowing
immediate appeal, the Court stressed the need to balance the inconvenience of piecemeal litigation
against the danger of denying justice. See 51 CORNELL L.Q. 369 (1966).
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case basis. In Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin,32 when an order dismissing
a class action left plaintiff with an individual claim for 70 dollars, the
court allowed immediate section 1291 appeal since, in view of the pro-
hibitive costs of continued litigation on the merits, the order was, for
all practical purposes, the "death knell" of the action.3 In another
case, a similar result was reached when plaintiff was left with a 1,000
dollar individual claim. The Second Circuit's death knell doctrine, how-
ever, does not grant rights to section 1291 appeal of all orders dismissing
class actions; the rule applies only when the situation justifies a reasona-
ble inference that, unless the order is immediately appealed, the case will
not be litigated because of plaintiff's insufficient claim. In decisions
involving individual claims of 1,560,00035 and 150,00036 dollars, and
most recently, 8,500 dollars,37 the Second Circuit denied section 1291
appeal on the grounds that the claims were sufficient to warrant contin-
ued adjudication on the merits, and that the dismissal of the class action
therefore did not fall within the death knell rationale. 38
In rejecting the death knell rule, the instant court first noted the
limited scope of the doctrine's application. Since dismissals of class
actions seeking injunctive relief have been granted mandatory rights of
appeal under section 1292(a)(1),39 and since the Second Circuit has
denied application of the death knell rationale when plaintiff retained
an individual claim of 8,500 dollars, 0 the instant court reasoned that the
doctrine operates only within a limited category of claims requesting
monetary relief under statutes providing exemptions from the 10,000
dollar jurisdictional requirement.41 Since these federal statutes usually
provide for judicial award of attorney's fees in addition to actual dam-
ages,42 the instant court observed that dismissal of a class action leaving
plaintiff with an insignificant monetary claim would not foreclose an
32. 370 F.2d 119 (2d Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 1035 (1967).
33. 370 F.2d at 120-21. Since the Cohen holding required a final determination of the issue
on appeal, and since an order denying certification of a class action may be amended at any time
prior to disposition on the merits, the chief support for the Eisen decision must be Gillespie. See
notes 5 & 27, supra and accompanying text.
34. Green v. Wolf Corp., 406 F.2d 291 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 977 (1969).
35. City of New York v. International Pipe & Ceramics Corp., 410 F.2d 295 (2d Cir. 1969).
36. Caceres v. International Air Transport Ass'n, 422 F.2d 141 (2d Cir. 1970).
37. Korn v. Franchard Corp., 443 F.2d 1301 (2d Cir. 1971).
38. Cases cited notes 35-37 supra. See 48 N.C.L. REv. 626 (1970).
39. See note 23 supra and accompanying text.
40. Korn v. Franchard, 443 F.2d 1301 (2d Cir. 1971). See note 37 supra and accompanying
text.
41. See 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1970) (suits brought under federal antitrust laws).
42. See 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1970) (antitrust); 15 U.S.C. § 78aa (1970) (securities act violation).
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individual suit since plaintiff's attorney would retain the incentive of
compensation awarded by the court. Moreover, the court recognized
that the increasing availability of legal service organizations and public
interest law firms as consumer advocates would cause death knells to
ring with less frequency. The court next examined the policies underly-
ing class actions based on such federal statutes. Although it acknowl-
edged that private enforcement under these acts effectively supplements
federal regulatory aims, the court nevertheless stressed that federal ap-
pellate courts must be protected from excessive numbers of interlocu-
tory appeals. From a balancing of these interests, the court concluded
that both justice and efficiency were best served through limiting the
availability of appeal to the existing procedures of section 1292(b),43
rule 54(b),11 and mandamus,45 which possess the advantage of emphasiz-
ing judicial discretion in the decision to allow appeal.46 Finally, viewing
the death knell rationale as arising from the assumption that no compe-
tent lawyer would take complex litigation for a small amount of money,
the instant court posed as the most basic issue whether an attorney
possesses a separate interest in his fee sufficient to invoke the "collateral
order" doctrine of Cohen.4 7 The court refused to recognize this interest,
and suggested that if an individual claim were so small that no lawyer
would be willing to litigate it, then perhaps "the time of the lawyers and
of the court should best be spent elsewhere." 4
The instant court's refusal to adopt the death knell rationale under-
scores the difficulties of balancing the policies in favor of the final
judgment rule against the policies supporting class actions. Although the
need to avoid piecemeal litigation has become more urgent in recent
years through the increased crowding of our courts," that need must be
circumscribed when necessary to preserve justice and to carry out the
congressional intent behind remedial federal statutes. The denial of
immediate appeal in death knell situations, when continued individual
43. See notes 8 & 20 supra and accompanying text.
44. See notes 25-26 supra and accompanying text.
45. See notes 16-18 supra and accompanying text.
46. The instant court apparently considered that a judicial option in granting appeals is
preferable to an affirmative right of appeal.
47. 455 F.2d at 625-26.
48. Id. at 626. A vigorous dissent was entered by Judge Rosenn, who considered the order
to be appealable under the death knell rationale as an extension of both the Cohen and Gillespie
principles. The dissent emphasized the importance of a right to immediate appeal in such death
knell situations to protect the rights of plaintiff and other small-claim consumers to relief. 455 F.2d
at 631 (Rosenn, J., dissenting).
49. See, e.g., Carrington, Crowded Dockets and the Court of Appeals: The Threat to the
Function of Review and the National Law, 82 HARV. L. REv. 542 (1969).
[Vol. 25
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litigation is not feasible, may abrogate the rights of both the plaintiff
and the represented class, and, in addition, may contravene a direct
governmental interest in continued maintenance of the suit. Through
provisions obviating the 10,000 dollar jurisdictional requirement in ac-
tions brought under the antitrust and securities statutes, Congress
sought to encourage small-claim private litigation as a supplement to
public enforcement of these federal laws. It is unlikely, however, that
Congress intended thereby to promote a multiplicity of small individual
suits which would overwhelm the already crowded dockets and prove
costly to both plaintiffs and courts. The only means of efficiently imple-
menting these provisions appears to be the class action, which, while
providing only small individual recoveries, creates through its aggregate
form a significant deterrent to regulatory violations. The instant court's
preoccupation with the prevention of interlocutory appeals and with the
attorney's role and motive in prosecuting class actions thus disregards
the most significant interests at issue-those of the public and of the
government in enforcing federal regulatory schemes. Moreover, the al-
ternative appellate remedies deemed advantageous by the court do not
provide adequate appellate protection for these interests. Certification
under both section 1292(b) and rule 54(b) is at the discretion of the very
court that ordered the action dismissed. In practice, such certification
appears difficult to obtain." Plaintiffs should also not be forced to rely
upon mandamus, which usually will be available only in situations in-
volving an obvious misuse of a district court's power. Admittedly the
death knell doctrine may be difficult to apply, since the cases indicate
the need for ad hoc judgments in determining whether a plaintiff might
reasonably continue his individual claim; perhaps the Supreme Court,
in view of the conflict among the circuits, will have occasion to formu-
late new and more efficient guidelines. One possible approach would be
to allow plaintiff the right to a voluntary dismissal of his individual
claim under a modified form of Rule 41(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, which, unlike the standard 41(a) dismissal, would operate as
an adjudication on the merits and thus permit immediate section 1291
appeal.5' This method would, in effect, allow plaintiff to establish the
50. See notes 22 & 26 supra and accompanying text (only one instance of application for
each remedy was found).
51. FED. R. COv. P. 41(a) permits a plaintiff to dismiss his individual action by either filing
a notice of dismissal at any time before service of an answer from the adverse party, or by filing a
stipulation of dismissal signed by all parties who have appeared in the action. Unless otherwise
ordered by the court, such dismissal will not, however, operate as an adjudication on the merits.
FED. R. Ov. P. 41(b) also allows an involuntary dismissal for plaintiff's failure to prosecute, which
would act as an adjudication on the merits and permit immediate appeal. Involuntary dismissal,
19721
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basic requirement of the death knell doctrine that adjudication on the
merits of the individual claim will not be continued, without the judicial
fact finding necessary in applying the rule itself, and would create an
efficient procedural vehicle through which the crux of the litigation-the
class action issue-may be pursued.
Evidence-Impeachment-Admission of Prior Convic-
tion To Impeach Defendant-Witness Violates Constitu-
tional Right to Due Process
Defendant was tried in a Hawaii state court for first degree murder.
During the trial, defendant chose to testify in his own defense. In order
to impeach defendant's credibility as a witness, the prosecutor intro-
duced the record of defendant's previous felony conviction., The evi-
dence was admitted for impeachment purposes pursuant to a state stat-
ute providing that evidence of prior convictions of a defendant-witness
may be introduced in criminal cases to attack the credibility of the
accused's testimony.2 Upon conviction defendant appealed, contending
that the trial court's admission of the prior conviction even for impeach-
ment purposes constituted an unreasonable burden upon his constitu-
tonal right to testify in his own behalf, and thereby denied him due
process of law under the fourteenth amendment.3 On appeal to the
Hawaii Supreme Court, held, reversed. When a criminal defendant
chooses to testify in his own defense, the admission of evidence of prior
convictions to impeach his credibility as a witness denies the accused his
fourteenth amendment right to due process. State v. Santiago, 492 P.2d
657 (Hawaii 1971).
however, must be made by defendant's motion, just as 41(a) dismissal usually will require
defendant's signature on the stipulation. This dependence upon defendant's cooperation would have
to be eliminated in order to effectuate the 41(a) or (b) dismissal as a substitute for the death knell
doctrine. See Note, Interlocutory Appeal from Order Striking Class Action Allegations, 70
COLUM. L. REv. 1292 (1970).
1. Defendant had been convicted previously of first degree burglary.
2. The prosecutor relied on HAWAII REv. LAWS § 621-22 (1968), which provides that "a
witness may be questioned as to whether he has been convicted of any indictable or other offense
3. Defendant also contended that custodial admissions which he had made were inadmissible
to impeach his credibility as a witness, that the jury had been improperly instructed by the trial
judge to presume the existence of malice aforethought, and that the trial court improperly excluded
defendant's proposed self-defense instruction.
[Vol. 25
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At common law, an individual convicted of an infamous crime was
incompetent to testify as a witness.' The rationale supporting this rule
was that persons who had committed such crimes could not be trusted.5
The common-law rule was criticized on the ground that an individual's
prior criminal conviction is not necessarily relevant to the question
whether he will testify truthfully in a subsequent trial.6 Although the
common-law rule was effectively abrogated in the nineteenth century,7
the principle of the rule, that individuals convicted of infamous crimes
lack credibility, has persisted. While one who has a prior record convic-
tion for an infamous crime is able to testify, his credibility as a witness
is subject to attack through the introduction of his prior conviction into
evidence.' The same rule governs a criminal defendant who testifies in
his own behalf.? As a result of this rule, the previously convicted defen-
dant is confronted with a dilemma. If he takes the stand and his prior
convictions are admitted into evidence, the jury, despite limiting instruc-
tions, might consider the prior conviction as evidence of the defendant's
guilt rather than as a measure of his credibility. On the other hand, if
he does not testify, the jury is likely to infer that the defendant cannot
truthfully deny or explain the charges against him and is therefore
guilty. 0 Despite recognition of this dilemma, the courts have upheld this
form of impeachment, reasoning that the possibility of prejudice is out-
weighed by the legitimate purpose to be served by informing the jury of
the defendant's character." The courts seek to reduce the prejudicial
impact of the evidence through instructions that explain to the jury that
the defendant's criminal record can be considered solely as a reflection
4. See 2 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 519, at 608 (1940).
5. See id. See also Ladd, Credibility Tests-Current Trends, 89 U. PA. L. REV. 166, 184
(1940).
6. Many crimes have no reasonable relationship to veracity. See 7 J. BENTHAM, RATIONALE
OF JUDICIAL EVIDENCE 406 (Bowring's ed. 1827) quoted in 2 J. WIGMORE EVIDENCE § 519, at 610.
7. In England, competency for witnesses in civil cases came first, followed by competency
for criminal defendants. See An Act for Improving the Law of Evidence, 6 & 7 Vict., c. 85, 551-
52 (1843); Criminal Evidence Act, 61 & 62 Vict., c. 36, 117-19 (1898).
8. See, e.g., ALA. CODE tit. 7, § 435 (1960); CONN. GEN. STAT. REV. § 52-145 (1968); FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 90.08 (1960);.MD. ANN. CODE art. 35, § 10 (1971); MIss. CODE ANN. § 1692
(1957); ORE. REV. STAT. § 44.020 (1971); WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 5.60.040 (1963).
9. See, e.g., People v. Wright, 72 I11. App. 2d 150, 218 N.E.2d 798 (1966), cert. denied, 390
U.S. 1008 (1968); State v. McClain, 404 S.W.2d 186, 190 (Mo. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1016
(1967); Commonwealth v. Quaranta, 295 Pa. 264, 272, 145 A. 89, 92 (1928).
10. See C. MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE § 43, at 93-94 (1954). See also Note, To Take the Stand
or Not to Take the Stand: The Dilemma of the Defendant With a Criminal Record, 4 COLUM.
J.L. & Soc. PROB. 215 (1968).
11. See State v. Cote, 108 N.H. 290, 297, 235 A.2d 111, 116 (1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S.
1025 (1968); State v. Duke, 100 N.H. 292, 293, 123 A.2d 745, 746 (1956).
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of his credibility. 2 Surveys have indicated, however, that juries are often
unable to follow such limiting instructions. 3 The studies show that
juries are less likely to acquit a defendant when they are informed of
his criminal record." Because the defendant is subjected to this danger
of prejudice, commentators have roundly criticized the practice of ad-
mitting evidence of prior convictions to impeach defendant-witnesses.,'
The force of this criticism has prompted at least two efforts to reform
statutory rules of evidence" concerning the impeachment of defendant-
witnesses. Both the Model Code of Evidence 7 and the Uniform Rules
of Evidence"8 recommend that the credibility of a defendant-witness
should not be attacked by introduction of prior convictions unless the
previous offense involved dishonesty or false statement. Neither of these
proposed statutory reforms has been widely accepted, however, possibly
because of the anticipated adoption of the proposed rules of evidence
for the federal courts. The federal rules for impeachment of defendant-
witnesses are not materially different from the recommendations of the
Model Code and the Uniform Rules. 9 A prior conviction also is inad-
missible under the federal rules, however, if it predates by more than
ten years the witness's release from prison.20 The federal rules are based
primarily on the assumption that there is a positive correlation between
an individual's prior criminal conviction and his subsequent disposition
12. See People v. Smith, 63 Cal. 2d 779, 409 P.2d 222,46 Cal. Rptr. 382 (1966) (approving
the following instruction to the jury: "You must not use this evidence in determining the defen-
dant's guilt or innocence of the other charges, nor must you permit yourself to be influenced against
the defendant because he may have suffered a prior felony conviction."). Id. at 791, 409 P.2d at
230, 46 Cal. Rptr. at 390.
13. See H. KALVEN & H. ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY 127-30, 160 (1966). Juries that
learned of past convictions through impeachment convicted defendants 27% more often than juries
without knowledge of the defendant's criminal record. See also Note, supra note 10, at 217-18;
Note, The Limiting Instruction-Its Effectiveness and Effect, 51 MINN. L. REV. 264 (1966).
14. H. KALVEN & H. ZEISEL, supra note 13, at 160, 177-81.
15. See, e.g., C. MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE § 43 (1954); 3A J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 890
(Chadbourn rev. 1970); Glick, Impeachment by Prior Convictions: A Critique of Rule 6-09 of the
Proposed Rules of Evidence for United States District Courts, 6 CRIM. L. BULL. 330 (1970);
Griswold, The Long View, 51 A.B.A.J. 1017, 1021 (1965). See also Gustafson, Have We Created
a Paradise for Criminals?, 30 S. CAL. L. REV. 1 (1956); McGowan, Impeachment of Criminal
Defendants by Prior Convictions, 1970 L. & Soc. ORDER 1.
16. See, e.g., ALA. CODE tit. 7, § 435 (1960); CONN. GEN. STAT. REV. § 52-145 (1968);
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 90.08 (1960).
17. MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE rule 106 (1942).
18. UNIFORM RULES OF EVIDENCE 21.
19. JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, COMMITTEE ON RULES OF PRACTICE
AND PROCEDURE, PRELIMINARY DRAFT OF PROPOSED RULES OF EVIDENCE FOR THE UNITED




to tell the truth. Not all attempts to modify the conviction-impeachment
rules have involved proposals for legislative reform. On the judicial side,
the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia held
in Luck v. United States2t that a trial court is not required, under the
applicable statute,'2 to allow impeachment by prior convictions every
time a defendant takes the stand in his own defense. The District of
Columbia Circuit has followed Luck in subsequent decisions,2 3 but the
vitality of the Luck doctrine was substantially limited by a recent
amendment 24 to the statute upon which the Luck decision was based.
The amendment was challenged in Dixon v. United States2 as violative
of the fifth and sixth amendment principles incorporated in the previous
version of the statute through the gloss placed on that version by the
Luck decision; the District of Columbia Court, however, held that the
Luck decision was not based on constitutional grounds, and that the
amendment was valid. Aside from use of the apparently limited Luck
rationale by the District of Columbia Circuit, the only other judicially
imposed limitation on the impeachment rule has been that applied by
the Hawaii Supreme Court. In a civil case, Asato v. Furtado,6 the
Hawaii court held that prior convictions can be admitted to impeach the
defendant-witness only when the trial judge is convinced that the propo-
nent of the evidence has satisfactorily established that the past convic-
tion is relevant to the present veracity of the witness.2Y The Luck and
Asato decisions represent judicial attempts to restrict impeachment
through evidence of prior convictions. Nevertheless, neither court was
willing to prohibit this form of impeachment evidence.
In the instant case, the court initially acknowledged that the
conviction-impeachment rule is generally accepted. After examining the
manner in which this general rule is applied, however, the court con-
cluded that the rule is unnecessarily prejudicial to defendants with prior
21. 348 F.2d 763 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
22. D.C. Code Ann. § 14-305 (1967).
23. See, e.g., Jones v. United States, 402 F.2d 639 (D.C. Cir. 1968); Barber v. United States,
392 F.2d 517 (D.C. Cir. 1968); Gordon v. United States, 383 F.2d 936 (D.C. Cir. 1967). But see
Brown v. United States, 370 F.2d 242 (D.C. Cir. 1966) (trial court did not abuse its discretion by
permitting the government to impeach defendant's testimony by showing a prior conviction). Most
of the cases have involved a criminal proceeding in which defendant had a prior criminal record.
The court, however, has held that the Luck doctrine applies to all witnesses. Davis v. United States,
409 F.2d 453, 456 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
24. District of Columbia Court Reform and Criminal Procedure Act of 1970, Pub. L. No.
91-358, § 133(b), 84 Stat. 473.
25. 40 U.S.L.W. 2554 (D.C. Cir. Jan. 31, 1972).
26. 52 Hawaii 284, 474 P.2d 288 (1970).
27. The court restricted the statutory provision allowing such impeachment, HAWAII REV.
LAWS § 621-22 (1968).
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convictions. In addition, the court found that this form of impeachment
unreasonably burdens the previously convicted defendant's constitu-
tional right to testify in his own defense.2 Citing the Asato restriction
on the conviction-impeachment rule in civil cases, the court concluded
that there is no compelling reason supporting any continued adherence
to the rule in criminal cases. Admittedly extending prior law, the court
held that to convict a criminal defendant when prior crimes are intro-
duced to impeach his credibility as a witness violates the accused's
constitutional right to testify in his own defense and that a statute
providing for this form of impeachment is violative of the due process
clause of the fourteenth amendment of the United States Constitution.
The instant decision marks the first time a court has declared
unconstitutional a statute permitting the admission of evidence of prior
convictions to impeach the credibility of a defendant-witness. The im-
mediate significance of the decision is the constitutional protection it
extends to the criminal defendant with prior convictions who chooses
to testify in his own defense. The wider protection afforded effectively
eliminates the dilemma with which previously convicted criminal defen-
dants have been confronted.29 The criminal defendant no longer will be
reluctant to take the stand for fear that he will be prejudiced by the
introduction of his prior criminal record into evidence. The impact of
the instant decision may extend considerably beyond the abolition of the
conviction-impeachment rule in Hawaii, since other states may follow
the Hawii lead and declare unconstitutional statutes0 similar to the
Hawaii statute. Nevertheless, should the courts of other jurisdictions
find the due process analysis of the instant decision unpersuasive, there
are three additional constitutional challenges to impeachment statutes
that can be asserted. First, the statutes may violate the equal protection
clause of the fourteenth amendment because defendants with criminal
records are usually more reluctant to take the stand than those without
such records, and they are more often convicted when they do testify.3'
28. The U.S. Supreme Court has held that due process requires that the accused receive a
trial by an impartial jury free from outside influences. Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 362.
In addition, the Court has held that a procedure which "involves such a probability that prejudice
will result ... is deemed inherently lacking in due process." Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 542-43
(1965).
29. See materials cited note 10 supra.
30. See, e.g., ALA. CODE tit. 7, § 435 (1960); CONN. GEN. STAT. REV. § 52-145 (1968);
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 90.08 (1960); MD. ANN. CODE art. 35, § 10 (1971); MIss. CODE ANN. § 1692
(1957); ORE. REV. STAT. § 44.020 (1969); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 5.60.040 (1963).
31. See Note, Constitutional Problems Inherent in the Admissibility of Prior Record Con-
viction Evidence for the Purpose of Impeaching the Credibility of the Defendant Witness, 37 U.
CIN. L. RaV. 168 (1968).
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The de facto distinction between defendants having prior criminal con-
victions and those having none may violate the equal protection clause,
because there may be no rational basis for differentiating between the
classes of criminal defendants.32 Secondly, statutes that compel defen-
dants who testify in their own behalf to answer inquiries about prior
convictions 33 possibly are violative of the fifth amendment privilege
against self-incrimination. To the extent that prior conviction testimony
by defendants may prejudice the jury and result in the conviction of
defendants who otherwise would be acquitted, admission of prior con-
victions would seem tantamount to a confession of guilt. Thirdly, the
introduction of unnecessarily prejudicial information about the defen-
dant's past may constitute an infringement of the sixth amendment
guarantee of a trial by an impartial jury by rendering it unlikely that
the defendant will receive a fair opportunity to establish his
innocence.34 Therefore, the primary significance of the instant decision
is that it may serve as the catalyst for an emerging judicial trend toward
abrogation of conviction-impeachment statutes. Moreover, the instant
decision suggests a viable alternative to the two proposed statutory
reforms. Since the previously formulated statutory reform proposals
have not yet gained broad acceptance, 35 the drafting of a statute to
incorporate the holding of the instant case might represent the key to
widespread statutory reformation. Although it is important that other
jurisdictions adopt the principle of the instant decision, two further
considerations are relevant in a decision to alter the conviction-
impeachment rule. First, the instant decision may produce substantially
more litigation for already crowded state court dockets. Since all crimi-
nal defendants could testify without fear that prejudicial evidence of
their prior convictions would be introduced, defendants with previous
convictions may forego bargained guilty pleas in favor of jury trials,
32. Furthermore, since the jury is presumably qualified to determine whether or not a witness
is telling the truth from his demeanor and his reaction to probing cross-examination, there was
actually no need for the impeachment rule in the first place, regardless of the nature of the
defendant's prior conviction. See Note, Procedural Protections of the Criminal Defendant-A
Reevaluation of the Privilege against Self-Incrimination and the Rule Excluding Evidence of
Propensity to Commit Crime, 78 HARV. L. REv. 426, 440 (1964).
33. See Note, The Use of Prior Convictions to Impeach the Credibility of the Criminal
Defendant, 71 W. VA. L. REV. 160, 165-66 (1969).
34. See Note, The Limiting Instruction-Its Effectiveness and Effect, 51 MINN. L. REV. 264,
286 (1966).
35. Kansas has adopted verbatim the recommendation of the Uniform Rules of Evidence.
See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-421 (1964). New Jersey recently adopted the Uniform Rules, but
omitted rule 21. See N.J. REV. STAT. § 2A:84A-16 (Supp. 1971). California recently revised its
evidence code, but evidence of a witness's prior felony conviction is still admissible for impeach-
ment purposes. CAL. EVID. CODE § 788 (West 1966).
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thereby increasing the burden on state courts and prosecutors. Nonethe-
less, to the extent that the holding in the instant case requires the state
to prove the guilt of a defendant who previously feared conviction by a
prejudiced jury, the impact of the decision is commendable. Secondly,
the instant decision does not prohibit the introduction of prior convic-
tions in the form of circumstantial evidence. Criminal defendant-
witnesses will be subjected to prejudice whenever the prosecutor can
successfully convince the court that evidence of the previous conviction
should be admissible to establish an essential element of the charged
offense.36 Although the instant court failed to take steps to avoid these
problems, the important stride that it did take should be followed by
other states to establish uniform protection for criminal defendant-
witnesses.
36. See, e.g., Spencer v. Texas, 385 U.S. 554, 560-61 (1967); Drew v. United Sates, 331 F.2d
85, 90 (D.C. Cir. 1964). See also C. MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE § 157, at 328-31 (1954).
